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Abstract
Background: Yobe State has faced severe disruption of its health service as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency.
A systems dynamics analysis was conducted to identify key pathways of threat to provision and emerging
pathways of response and adaptation.
Methods: Structured interviews were conducted with 39 stakeholders from three local government areas selected
to represent the diversity of conflict experience across the state: Damaturu, Fune and Nguru, and with four officers
of the PRRINN-MNCH program providing technical assistance for primary care development in the state. A group
model building session was convened with 11 senior stakeholders, which used participatory scripts to review
thematic analysis of interviews and develop a preliminary systems model linking identified variables.
Results: Population migration and transport restrictions have substantially impacted access to health provision. The
human resource for health capability of the state has been severely diminished through the outward migration of
(especially non-indigenous) health workers and the suspension of programmes providing external technical
assistance. The political will of the Yobe State government to strengthen health provision — through lifting a
moratorium on recruitment and providing incentives for retention and support of staff — has supported a
recovery of health systems functioning. Policies of free-drug provision and decentralized drug supply appear
to have been protective of the operation of the health system. Community resources and cohesion have
been significant assets in combatting the impacts of the insurgency on service utilization and quality. Staff
commitment and motivation — particularly amongst staff indigenous to the state — has protected health
care quality and enabled flexibility of human resource deployment.
Conclusions: A systems analysis using participatory group model building provided a mechanism to identify
key pathways of threat and adaptation with regard to health service functioning. Generalizable systems
characteristics supportive of resilience are suggested, and linked to wider discussion of the role of factors such
as diversity, self-regulation and integration.
Keywords: Health systems, Systems dynamics, Group model building, Causal loop diagrams, Conflict,
Insurgency, Insecurity, Service provision, Quality, Political will, Community cohesion, Staff commitment, Staff
motivation
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Background
Health systems resilience in contexts of adversity
Resilience has emerged as the dominant concept underpin-
ning development assistance and humanitarian support in
nations vulnerable—through conflict or natural disaster —
to crisis [1–3]. DFID has defined resilience as ‘the ability…
to manage change, by maintaining or transforming…stan-
dards in the face of shocks or stresses....without comprom-
ising… long-term prospects” [4]. Fostering a complex
adaptive systems approach, it is recognized that ‘the ability
of the system or process to deal with the shock or stress is
based on the levels of exposure, the levels of sensitivity and
adaptive capacities’ [4].
UNICEF has taken a leading role in seeking to specify
such adaptive systems capacities, specifying the role of flexi-
bility; diversity; adaptive learning; collective action and
cohesion; and self-reliance [5]. Oxfam has posited similar
factors to be characteristic of resilient systems: diversity;
connectivity; utilizing different forms of knowledge; redun-
dancy; equality and inclusivity; and high levels of social
cohesion and capital [6]. Resilience is one of the three
framing concepts of the DFID strategy on humanitarian
assistance emerging from response to the 2011 UK parlia-
mentary Humanitarian Emergency Response Review [4].
More recently resilience has come to the fore as a con-
struct relevant to understanding the basis for health ser-
vices continuing in contexts of major adversity, most
notably in the context of health systems in West Africa
and management of the Ebola virus outbreak [7, 8].
As a construct, resilience is, however, not without
critique. For example, its weak operationalization has
frequently been noted [9]. Concerns have also been
expressed regarding potential blindness to imbalances in
power reflected in technical analysis of sources of resilience
[10]. Nonetheless, there is wide recognition that resilience
potentially provides a valuable framework for policy and
practice on the basis of its focus on developing the capaci-
ties of populations and anticipating ‘shocks’ to systems. In
particular, the capacity to ‘bounce back’ from adversity is
increasingly being conceptualized as the response of com-
plex adaptive systems to experienced shocks. Work from
a wide range of disciplines — ranging from agricul-
ture and climate science [11–13], through public
health and community development [14–16] to an-
thropology and psychology [17, 18] — is seeing the
behaviour of complex adaptive systems in adverse
conditions as core to understanding resilience. That
is, resilience is not so much the culmination of a
number of additive ‘protective factors’ but the out-
come of a range of interacting systems and influ-
ences, operating at a variety of levels. Such an
insight requires the deployment of analytic tools and
frameworks suited to the analysis of complex adap-
tive systems, such as dynamic systems modelling.
Systems dynamics has been proposed as a perspective to
address the dynamic complexity which is characteristic of
many public health issues [19, 20]. Although there are a
wide range of approaches to systems dynamics modelling,
[21] these generally share the premise that complex systems
behavior results from the interplay of feedback loops, mul-
tiple interconnections, non-linearities, time delays, stocks,
and flows that all occur within a system, which can be
mapped and, in some circumstances, modelled using com-
puter simulation [22]. System dynamics modelling may
draw upon both qualitative and quantitative data relevant
for exploring the dynamic context of health care policy in-
terventions [23]. Although the development of simulations
is an end-product of much systems modelling, the core goal
of such efforts is an increased understanding of a problem
and of the system in which it is taking place.[24] Group
model building (GMB) has emerged as a particularly prom-
ising approach, in which models are developed to reflect
diverse stakeholders’ views of the problem, often as part of
an ongoing action research agenda [25, 26]. In particular,
Hovmand and colleagues have shown the value of partici-
patory group model building as a mechanism for eliciting
the mental models that shape stakeholders' behaviour [27].
This study formed part of a work programme1 which
explicitly extended the use of group model building to
understand, predict and potentially influence the processes
which support the resilience of health systems in contexts
of adversity. While grounded in settings of particular polit-
ical instability, the work was conceived to be of relevance to
health systems facing diverse forms of adversity. Conduct-
ing analysis through a method involving intensive, partici-
patory consultation with stakeholders and representation
and refinement of models using graphical systems tools
was seen to offer a particularly effective means of exploring
the determinants of systems vulnerability and resilience.
The work programme covered three case studies, focused
on Cote d’Ivoire, Northern Nigeria, and Eastern Cape
province in South Africa. This paper reports on the
Northern Nigeria study.
This study was completed in collaboration with the
Partnership for Reviving Routine Immunization in
Northern Nigeria and Maternal Newborn Child Health
(PRRINN-MNCH) programme. PRRINN-MNCH had been
operating in Northern Nigeria since 2008 with support
from the UK Department of International Development
(DFID) and the State Department of the Norwegian
Government. The programme aimed to impact maternal,
newborn and child health in Northern Nigeria by improv-
ing access to maternal and child health, including routine
immunization services, in four States: Jigawa, Katsina,
Zamfara and Yobe. Of these four states it is the latter that
has been most significantly impacted by the Boko Haram
insurgency. It was on this basis that Yobe was selected as
the geographical focus for the case study.
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The Boko Haram insurgency in Yobe State
Yobe State2 has experienced attacks from the militant
group popularly known as Boko Haram (‘against Western
education’) since 2011. Initially the group targeted police
and churches, but from 2012 the attacks — bombings,
military raids and robberies — expanded to target
mosques, schools, hospitals, and banks.
The neighbouring states of Borno and Adamawa were
similarly affected and a state of emergency was declared in
these states in May 2013. The situation created much fear
and panic among citizens. People left their homes and
migrated to what were seen as safer locations. This signifi-
cantly disrupted livelihoods as people were displaced from
their land and other places of work. Security concerns and
travel restrictions imposed by the state severely curtailed
opportunities for commerce. As the insurgency evolved,
Boko Haram started burning villages and kidnapping com-
munity leaders. At the time of writing, Yobe state is still in
a declared state of emergency. Many organizations have
terminated their operations in the state, while those who
continued working (such as PRRINN-MNCH) have done
so with key activities (such as consultation meetings and
trainings) conducted outside the state. This has increased
the costs of programme implementation significantly.
The health system has been majorly affected by these
events. Health workers, especially those not indigenous
to Yobe, have fled to other states. Indigenous workers
are generally reported to have only temporarily aban-
doned their work places during spikes of insecurity,
returning when the situation improved. Some health fa-
cilities have been directly attacked, with insurgents tak-
ing away drugs, hospital equipment, ambulances and
other vehicles.
In some instances health workers have been abducted,
while others have been killed by blasts when traveling to or
from work. Some hospitals have had to be closed for some
time until the local situation normalized. Movement for
health workers and patients to access health facilities has
been a major challenge due to curfews imposed by the
security services (the Joint Task Force, JTF). Curfews have
been regularly declared and significantly restricted move-
ment. When curfews are lifted, delays are frequent because
of multiple checkpoints mounted on the roads. On initial
deployment of the JTF, with no established relationship be-
tween locals and the largely non-indigenous security forces,
harassment was reportedly common, though cooperation
grew with greater mutual familiarity.
Other aspects of counter-insurgency response —
such as the banning of motorcycles (a favored means
of transport for Boko Haram raids), the prohibition of
the growing of any plant over 1 m high (seen to pro-
vide cover for insurgents) and the interruption of
cellphone service (to restrict contact between insur-
gents during major anti-insurgency operations) —
have also contributed to a challenging environment
for the functioning of, and access to, health services.
Methods
The study was structured according to four distinct
phases of activity, following the conventions of sys-
tems dynamics analysis adopting a group model build-
ing approach [27]. The first phase was focused on the
development of a scenario definition (defining the
boundaries of the case study) and subsequent inter-
views with key informants. The scenario definition
was constructed on the basis of preliminary planning
discussions with key PRRINN-MNCH staff, including
the National Programme Manager, the Deputy National
Programme Manager and the Yobe State Team Manager.
This confirmed Yobe as the geographical focus of the
study and primary health care provision as the principal
service focus of analysis. This also informed a structured
interview guide regarding major challenges faced in the
course of the insurgency and strategies to address them.
Given logistical constraints on interview coverage and
the varied impact of the insurgency in different parts of
the state, the scenario definition further focused de-
tailed analysis on three of Yobe’s 17 Local Government
Areas (LGAs). These comprised: Damaturu (the loca-
tion of the state capital, which has been both directly —
through attacks — and indirectly — through migration —
impacted by the insurgency), Fune (a rural area dir-
ectly impacted by the insurgency at varying times)
and Nguru (an area that has experienced no direct at-
tacks, but has been indirectly impacted through sig-
nificant inward migration).
Thirty-nine interviews were conducted across these three
LGAs in May through June 2014. Interviewees included
health managers, local government officials, health facility
personnel and patients. In addition, four PRRINN-MNCH
staff were formally interviewed: the National Programme
Manager, the Deputy National Programme Manager, the
Yobe State Team Manager and the Operations Research
Coordinator. Thus a total of 43 interview transcripts were
available to inform the second phase of the study.
This second phase involved preliminary data analysis
and planning. Two members of the research team and
two PRRINN-MNCH staff based in Yobe served as the
core planning team. Each member of the planning
team reviewed all transcripts of interviews and then
independently identified key themes emerging from
them. The members of the planning team then worked
together to group themes and consolidate them into
defined variables. The planning team then developed
an interrelationship diagraph (IRD) identifying what
was suggested, from the data reviewed, to be major
causal linkages between these variables, as well as the
key drivers and outcomes within the system. Informed
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by the IRD, the planning group then specified a ‘seed
model’ as a starting point for model building at the
group model building (GMB) workshop. Finally the
team developed a series of scripts to structure discus-
sion at that workshop. The scripts are a detailed de-
scription of the processes followed during GMB
sessions (based upon the work of Hovmand and
others [24–27]).
The third phase involved the GMB workshop itself,
held in June 2014. This was a one-day session for 11
participants, identified by the planning team as repre-
senting key perspectives on the functioning of the
health system in Yobe during the insurgency. This in-
cluded representatives of the State Ministry of Health,
the State Primary Health Care Management Board,
and Health Training Institutions (HTIs); the Medical
Director of Damaturu Specialist Hospital; a local en-
gagement officer who had conducted key informant
interviews; and four senior staff of PRRINN-MNCH.
Scripts were used to: elicit a shared understanding of
key characteristics of the insurgency (using a ‘rich
picture’ exercise in which participants created a shared
drawing of the situation under consideration); review,
confirm, illustrate and elaborate upon the listing of
variables identified by the planning team; link these
variables, building upon the provided ‘seed model’, by
specifying two preliminary systems models accounting
for experience in a specified urban and rural location
in the state respectively; and consolidate these two
models into a single causal loop diagram with the aid of
Vensim graphical software3. The GMB session closed with
a reflection on the insights prompted by the preceding
analysis and the availability of data to facilitate quantitative
refinement of the model.
Phase four of the study involved processes of docu-
mentation, refinement and dissemination. A full tran-
script of GMB discussions was produced, and the data
used to elaborate the analysis which follows. Health
Management Information System (HMIS) data for par-
ticular locations — Damaturu LGA, Gujba LGA (a proxy
for Fune LGA, with similar insurgency experience) and
Nguru LGA — was extracted and consolidated. Along
with data from other sources (such as the Yobe State
Human Resources Information System) this was princi-
pally used for triangulation of statements made during
interviews and the GMB. Data was not available with
sufficient completeness and reliability to document
changes in key variables over time and complete sensi-
tivity analyses. Refinement therefore focused on clarifica-
tion of key pathways of threat and response, and
identification of key leverage points. This analysis was
reviewed and validated through a dissemination work-
shop held with local stakeholders in Damaturu in
December 2014.
Results
Fifteen variables were confirmed by GMB participants as
key in accounting for health systems functioning during
the crisis. These are considered, in turn, below. During
the course of modeling, an additional 12 variables were
specified as intervening factors clarifying linkages between
variables, with staff commitment and motivation, the most
elaborated. The linkages identified between all these vari-
ables are shown in Fig. 1, the causal loop diagram devel-
oped by participants during the GMB exercise.
Insecurity
Between June 2011 and August 2014 there were numerous
documented attacks by Boko Haram within Yobe state
resulting in an estimated 1341 fatalities [28]. Incidents
peaked in October 2012, with over 12 reported attacks and
140 fatalities. There were 252 deaths in Yobe state in the
first 6 months of 2014 alone [29]. Interviews documented
many incidents vividly illustrating this prevailing insecurity:
One health facility worker, for example, reported:
When Dogon Kuka was attacked, people ran away
and the health facility was closed for almost three
months. One security guard was killed in his house.
Another health worker told of how one day gun shots
started when she was in the office and there was no way
she could move to her house easily. All the staff lay on
the ground, weeping on the bare floor tiles.
Due to such insecurity, many people felt compelled to
migrate out of their villages, and health workers left their
workstations for safer places. Insecurity also created move-
ment challenges, as people were afraid of being attacked
when traveling because insurgents often blocked the roads
and attacked people.
During the GMB session one participant reported an
incident regarding some health workers who were attacked
after the prevailing 6.00 pm curfew because they had been
called to render services at the hospital due to an emer-
gency. Even though they had IDs to allow them to
travel during curfew hours, the Nigerian police had
physically harassed them. There were a number of re-
ports of the police abusing their power through as-
saults. This situation was aggravated when the ‘Escobar’7
phenomenon was at its peak, since one could not differen-
tiate between the official security forces and criminal
gangs because they were all wearing uniforms, carrying
guns, and driving HILUX vehicles. Such incidents were re-
ported to have been at their peak during 2012 and 2013.
Migration of people
As the bombings, abductions and killings became wider
and more indiscriminate in their scope, increasing num-
bers of people relocated to what were perceived to be safer
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areas. When attacks were concentrated on urban set-
tings, migration was to rural areas. When urban cen-
ters such as Damaturu became more secure, attacks
shifted to more rural areas, and migration was to-
wards the towns. For example, one of the inter-
viewees in Damaturu reported:
That time around, the patients have even migrated
and left the town because it is our catchment area,
Damaturu, that was affected by the activities of the
insurgents most especially in the Gwange area.
A GMB participant expressed similar sentiments and
stated that in the beginning the attacks were concen-
trated in Damaturu and people were moving from
Damaturu to various places. However the situation
changed when Damaturu was heavily secured by armed
forces, the insurgents turned to the rural areas, and the
migration patterns reversed.
Migration of health workers
Health workers were not spared in the killings and threats.
Indigenous workers generally abandoned their workplace
temporarily and returned whenever the situation calmed
down. However, most non-indigenous workers left perman-
ently. Records gathered from the Yobe state Human
Resource Information System (HRIS) indicate that the most
affected cadres of staff were doctors and nurses/midwives
as compared to other staff as presented in Tables 1 and 2.
With the exception of Gujba LGA, Table 1 indicates
that the number of health workers in other cadres had
increased in 2014 compared to 2010, which is an indica-
tion of a higher retention during the crisis.
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Fig. 1 Causal loop diagram of factors influencing health utilization and service quality during the insurgency in Yobe developed through group
model building
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However, figures in Table 2 indicate a significant decline
in the number of doctors and professional nurses/midwives
across each of the three LGAs over the same period. For
example, the general hospital in Buni Yadi lost all its three
doctors it had in 2010 and there was no doctor left at the
hospital by June 2014. The general hospital at Potiskum lost
about 90 % of its doctors over the same period. Only Sani
Abatcha State Specialist hospital seemed to have signifi-
cantly fared better, losing only 30 % of its physicians. 2014
figures are likely to reflect an upward trend from 2013
when the State Governor lifted an embargo on recruitment
in recognition of the acute shortages that had arisen (HRIS
data is not available for intervening years). GMB partici-
pants stated that more doctors are arriving and picking up
jobs in hospitals now, hence the increase.
The trend for professional nurses/midwives is similar.
For instance, Sani Abatcha Specialist Hospital lost 75 % of
its professional nurses/midwives while the general hospital
in Potiskum lost about 70 % of this cadre. Only General
Hospital Buni Yadi fared better, losing only about 25 % of
such staff. Midwives were especially affected because most
of them were from other states deployed through the
Midwives Service Scheme (MSS) and almost all of them
left the state at some point.
Key informants confirmed that during the crisis, most
health workers did not want to stay in Yobe state. One
participant at the GMB session stated:
In the hostel, a lot of medical doctors left, the National
Youth Service Corps (NYSCs) do not come to Yobe at
all, not even Damaturu. A lot of non-indigenes left, a
lot of indigenes who are outside Yobe couldn’t come.
But now it has been reversed. There were only four
NYSCs who reported initially but now there are 16.
Participants reported that more NYSCs were currently
coming to take up posts in Yobe state.
Movement challenges/restrictions
The many dangerous roads where insurgents could mount
ambushes presented significant challenges regarding
movement within the state. However, counter-insurgency
measures also led to major travel restrictions. Curfews
were sometimes set to begin as early as 4 pm, creating
major logistical travel difficulties. At times the JTF blocked
roads that were considered too dangerous for people to
travel on. Diversions, significantly adding to journey times,
would generally be provided, but on occasions no alterna-
tive routes were available, preventing all travel. Although
some categories of health staff were provided with IDs to
ease movements, there were still some challenges. One
participant noted:
The ‘Road Pass’ helps most times but still sometimes
it wouldn’t because it seems one is exposing himself
and you don’t know who else is watching, even the
security. It may come across like a particular person
thinks he is special and they may follow you and
attack you. So at times you may have the pass and
may not want to use it.
Another participant added to this experience stating:
Sometimes you have to bring your stethoscope out of
your car. Some of us have a ‘Road Pass’ to enable us
pass the queue but it does not prevent a search.
When there is high tension, when you go and meet
the security officer, they don’t understand but some of
them that understand may agree to search you and let
you go.
Supplies of drugs and consumables
GMB participants confirmed the view emerging from
stakeholder interviews that availability of drugs and other
consumables at facilities was, in general, not severely dis-
rupted by the insurgency. The State Ministry of Health and
facility managers minimized stock outs by changing deliver-
ies from the usual 1-month supply to a 3-month supply.
Additionally, facilities were encouraged to order new
stocks when they had 50 % of the drug stocks remaining. In
Table 1 Yobe state health workers by selected local government
area (LGA)
LGA Year
2010 2014
Gujba 529 292
Damaturu 468 583
Potiskum 368 450
Number of health workers (other than doctors and nurses/midwives) in 2010
and 2014 for specified LGAs. Source: Yobe State Human Resources
Information System
Table 2 Yobe state health workers by hospital
Hospital (LGA) Doctors Nurses/Midwives
2010 2014 2010 2014
General Hospital Buni Yadi (Gujba) 3 0 33 25
Sani Abatcha State Specialist Hospital (Damaturu) 24 17 107 27
General Hospital Potiskum (Potiskum) 11 1 86 26
Number of doctors and nurses/midwives in post in 2010 and 2014 for specified hospitals in Yobe state. Source: Yobe State Human Resources Information System
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the context of mass casualty events, some short-term drug
stock-outs were reported, but restocking was secured
swiftly. The decentralized nature of the drug supply chain,
with drugs managed at the state rather than federal level,
made it much easier to transport drugs to and from the
Damaturu drug store whenever transport routes were
secure. Flexibility in local supply routes helped secure sup-
plies when circumstances were volatile.
The GMB participants and key informant interviewees
both reported drugs being brought somewhere close to a
facility for collection by facility personnel once access was
possible. There was some evidence of commercial drug
supplies being more severely impacted due to transport
difficulties and loss of consumers' purchasing power. One
local drug vendor reported that to get a lorry to take their
drugs to Damaturu sometimes took up to 2 weeks. Even
when they got the transport, the price was double because
the drivers didn’t want to go to Damaturu due to the inse-
curity. Another supplier reported:
I used to sell an average of 30,000 Naira per day but
with the insurgency, I could only sell about 10,000
Naira a whole week.
Physical access to health services
Physical accessibility of health facilities was one of the
most important factors influencing patient utilization of
health services. Interviewed patients stated that during
the critical periods of the insurgency, it was extremely
difficult to get to a health facility due to travel restric-
tions and fear of being attacked. One patient noted:
As you know, we can’t come to hospital easily because
of their activities…people have suffered a lot because
of the insecurity, even if you are not well and you
want to come to the hospital it is a big problem…if
you intend to go to the hospital you are thinking of
what is going to happen to you on the way.
Some pregnant women were reported to have died as a
result of complications during delivery due to failure or
delay in accessing health facility care. One of the partici-
pants in the GMB session testified about his close friend
whose wife died in labour at home because she could not
be taken to the hospital due to travel challenges.
At some point, arrangements were made with the JTF for
security personnel to collect patients from their homes and
escort them to the health facilities when contacted through
a medical emergency telephone number. Unfortunately,
this service had later to be discontinued after insurgents
feigned illness and then ambushed the military forces com-
ing to attend them. This had resulted in an arrangement
where those telephoning the emergency number and pro-
viding a description of their vehicle were allowed to use
their own cars to access a health facility during curfew
hours. The JTF then monitored the passage of the vehicle
from a position of cover.
Financial barriers
Movement restrictions have limited people’s access to gain-
ful activities, hampering their financial capacities. People
could not trade their commodities for fear of attacks. From
the early months of the insurgency, farming of certain crops
such as maize was banned so that insurgents could not use
those fields as cover to launch their attacks. Also, due to
curfews and direct attacks, banks were only open for a
short period of time and some were completely closed.
There were also restrictions on interbank transfers. Even
those who had money in their bank accounts could not
easily access this money to transact business.
A number of interviewees noted that the financial bar-
riers to service access during the insurgency were, however,
significantly less than they would have been without the
introduction in 2009 of a state drug subsidy scheme. This
ensured that all pregnant women and children under-five
had access to free drugs. All drugs and materials required
to treat a medical emergency, such as a shooting or
bombing, were also covered. These arrangements, and
the separate ‘free MNCH’ programme operating in some
facilities, thus moderated the health impact of the disrup-
tion of livelihoods resulting from the insurgency.
Utilization of services
Interviews suggested that the level of security influenced
the use of services in a complex manner. If the number of
attacks was high in a particular area, the utilization of
services was low because patients were afraid to travel to
the health facilities. A medical doctor from one of the most
affected areas stated that most patients that came to seek
care did so when they were critically ill and required urgent
medical attention. Patients who were not severely sick
would defer or decline attendance due to insecurity.
Mothers who had appointments for routine immunization,
for example, often missed their appointments.
However, if an attack involved large numbers of casualties
then health facilities nearby would be filled with patients
injured during an attack. Areas that experienced fewer or
no attacks reported a general increase in patient attendance
because people had migrated to those places.
HMIS data on facility attendance confirmed great fluc-
tuations due to insurgency activities and related counter-
insurgency measures. For example, Damaturu has at times
been a major focus of attacks, but through counter-
insurgency measures has at other times been seen as a
relatively safe haven. Figs. 2 and 3 illustrate this pat-
tern of varying patient attendance for the three LGAs
for which HMIS data was reviewed.
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Figure 2 presents trends in total number of facility deliv-
eries per quarter in three LGAs from January 2012 to June
2014. The pattern indicates that whenever there was a
decrease in facility deliveries in Damaturu, there was a
corresponding increase of facility deliveries in Nguru. For
example, during the quarter July to September 2012, the
number of facility attended deliveries in Damaturu declined
to 21 deliveries from 797 in the previous quarter, while in
Nguru the numbers increased to 835 deliveries against 111
deliveries over the same period. By April to June 2013
Damaturu had experienced a sharp increase in facility deliv-
eries while in Nguru the numbers reduced to previous
levels. By late 2013 the pattern had reversed again, with de-
liveries in Damaturu steeply declining and those in Nguru
rising again. Attended deliveries in Gujba were relatively
stable, with some fluctuation, during this period.
Similarly, Fig. 3 shows total recorded facility attendance
across LGAs from April 2013 to June 2014. Reporting
from facilities was not complete during this period, so re-
ported rates are assumed to be an underestimate of total
attendance. However, with comparable reporting rates
across the three LGAs comparison of trends across the
different settings is likely valid.
This data suggests a marked increase in service
utilization in Nguru during the course of 2013 (in line
with the increase in attended deliveries during this
period). With no reported insurgent attacks in Nguru,
this appears to reflect internal migration within the
state to an area perceived as safe during a period of
major insecurity elsewhere.
Health worker workload
As most non-indigenous health workers left Yobe state,
fewer health workers were left to attend to patients. For
example, as noted earlier, the number of nurses/midwives
at the specialist hospital in Damaturu dropped from 107
in 2010 before the insurgency to 27 during the insurgency
period in early 2014.
Increased patient numbers at times of inward migra-
tion or mass casualty incidents exacerbated the impact
Fig. 2 Trends in facility deliveries: total facility deliveries per quarter for specified LGAs. Source: Yobe State HMIS
Fig. 3 Trends in facility attendance: total facility attendance per quarter for specified LGAs. Source: Yobe State HMIS
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of this on workload. For instance, through November
and December 2011, Damaturu experienced a number
of intense attacks where over 100 people were killed,
each resulting in many casualties requiring urgent treat-
ment. With increased workload the quality of services was
compromised because the few available staff could not
effectively attend to all the patients. Interviews documented
reports of patient deaths in the hospital attributed to delays
in treatment due to inadequate staffing levels. One nurse
noted:
I am a nurse by profession, so I have restrictions, I am
not supposed to be clerking patients, but when they
meet me, I have to step out to do the function of a
medical officer and also nursing work…the pressure
on me will definitely undermine efficiency.
Pressure on health infrastructure
Increased utilization of services at facilities also created
pressure on health infrastructure. Primary health care
workers regularly signaled the potential impact of this
on service quality:
the quality of services is not at all what I could call
standard because we have a lot of crowdedness due to
the turnout of the patients.
These pressures affected secondary and tertiary care
also. Bed space was frequently inadequate when patient
attendance increased beyond planned health facility cap-
acity. Mortuary capacity was reported to have often been
inadequate to meet demand following mass casualty inci-
dents. Hospitals had to ask the environmental department
to assist in clearing away the dead bodies. Pressure on
health infrastructure was so severe that it prompted the
state governor to intervene to release funds to construct
more mortuaries and extend hospital wards.
Liaison with security services
Liaison with security forces was key during the crisis to
enable essential movement of health workers during cur-
few hours. Doctors were sometimes called to go to the
hospital and help with emergencies but due to curfews
they would be restricted in their movement. The Ministry
of Health made arrangements with the JTF to allow health
workers to go to work during curfew hours through prior
arrangement with local security forces.
This was subsequently facilitated by the provision of
identity cards to show to the security personnel when
crossing checkpoints. However, health workers reported
sometimes being reluctant to show IDs for fear that this
exposed their identity to potential insurgents who on oc-
casions targeted killings of government personnel.
Community members also liaised with security forces
whenever they needed to transport a sick person to the
hospital or, more generally, if they wanted to report infor-
mation about insurgents in their community. However,
those seen talking to security forces were considered a dir-
ect target of insurgents, with one participant in the GMB
session claiming:
If they see you with the JTF number in your
cellphone, or you are talking to a security officer, you
are dead.
State officials would also regularly liaise with security
forces to seek to reduce curfew hours to enable citizens
to move around more freely and go about their business.
Duty shift patterns and task shifting
The restrictions in movement due to curfews created
challenges in the duty shift of health workers who were
scheduled to travel to work at restricted times. To re-
solve this challenge, the Hospitals Management Board
convened senior physicians and nurses and made a for-
mal change to the health worker duty shifts. Instead of
three 8-hour shifts, two 12-hour shifts were established.
This ensured continuity of staffing at facilities in a man-
ner achievable with curfew restrictions.
Other less formal adjustments to working practices were
also reported. In the context of the crisis, health workers
were reported to have assumed duties for which they were
not fully trained and licensed: a form of informal task-
shifting. Such flexibility in role allocations was widely per-
ceived as a necessity in the context of the prevailing crisis,
and a move that has demonstrated the significant capability
of less senior cadres.
Financial support
As a result of the crisis the health sector required add-
itional financial support to address the increased de-
mand for health services because of casualties. As
noted earlier, the State government was already funding
free drug programmes for specific groups before the in-
surgency, and this arrangement extended to covering
the costs of those attending for emergency intervention
following insurgent attacks.
Given State responsibilities for funding contributions to
the JTF security operation, Yobe state budgets for all sec-
tors, including health, were put under severe pressure. Lon-
ger term development projects (e.g. health facility
construction) were postponed, but generally finance for the
health sector was robustly supported. In 2013 the health
sector absorbed 97.3 % of its allocated budget, which repre-
sented a budgetary allocation double of that allocated for
the health sector in 2011 when the crisis had just begun
(and of which only 60 % had ultimately been disbursed).
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Political will
Stakeholders attributed financial support to the ‘polit-
ical will’ exhibited by the State Governor. His visits to
hospitals and other facilities in the aftermath of major
attacks were clearly appreciated. One participant at the
GBM session noted
Actually, the renovation to some extent was triggered
by the insurgency. The Governor was not even happy
about the capacity of the infrastructure and that is
why he declared a State of emergency on the health
sector. I recall the Governor having been around
more than ten times, which is unprecedented. He
comes at will, without being announced, just to see
everything that he needs to see and for some years
back sometimes it was hard to see the Governor.
Additionally the state provided security personnel in the
cities and also facilitated removal of some of the roadblocks
to support movement. More specifically to the health
sector, on appreciating the loss of capacity in the health
workforce with the loss of non-indigenous staff, the state
sanctioned the lifting of an established embargo on employ-
ment to the health sector. Further, the state provided incen-
tives to health workers such as offering furnished houses
and ensuring regular and on-time salary payment, which
was generally secured despite all the challenges with the
banking system.
Community resources/cohesion
Community support was regarded as a key factor that
helped community members to cope during the crisis. This
involved providing spiritual, emotional, and social support
to each other. Most of the interviewees mentioned that they
survived by faith and through prayers, indicating that
religion had played a major role in holding the people
together, giving them hope to go on and endure the crisis
and its suffering. Community members organized transport
for those who needed to access health facility services, and
provided shelter to those who had abandoned their homes
due to insecurity. One GMB participant recounted how he
had moved his family to a safer area but, in the context of
general fear and uncertainty, had recognized the need to
build the trust of the local community by attending Friday
prayers in that area.
Community members were a key source of informa-
tion regarding the insurgents. They would alert the health
workers not to conduct activities, especially immunization
campaigns, whenever the insurgents were operating within,
or close by, their local area.
Co-ordination of immunization is done through
community leaders because they are the ones that
know when there is threat of insurgency around them
since these health workers are with them, they work
hand in hand with them.
The community leaders are usually the one’s in the
center of co-ordination. They are the ones who usually
see [the insurgents] when they are passing. The health
clinic has nothing for now as a way of coordination.
We have tried to work hand in hand with all arms…
we had a series of meetings with emphasis on
community engagement in all the health
interventions. When you connect very well with the
community and traditional leaders, you will get
adequate information including security information
on how best they can deliver services. Sometimes if
health facilities are closed health workers are in their
houses, they can render services within their
community to the level that is feasible…..
Staff commitment and motivation
The preceding quotation highlights the importance of one
variable, not initially identified during thematic analysis,
which participants at the GMB considered important for
explanatory purposes: staff commitment and motivation.
Interviews and discussion indicated that commitment was
generally high among the health workers remaining in post
through the insurgency. Health workers reported encoun-
tering many challenges but this was usually reported to
have not deterred them from providing services to the
patients, although they often worked under fear. Most of
the facility in-charge persons reported that they used to
encourage and motivate their staff to ensure their availabil-
ity at the facility and this helped the health facilities to cope
during the crisis period. One facility in-charge reported:
Since I am in-charge of the facility, I don’t think there
was any time I did not come to work and I always orga-
nized my staff to come to work.
Patients who were interviewed backed up these asser-
tions. They also reported on the level of commitment
with which the health workers operated as stated by one
patient:
Thank God the truth is that the health workers are
trying their best to provide quality services.
Another patient reported:
The quality of service is good always and we find the
health workers there…before the insurgency the
number of health workers were more than now but
they are trying, even now.
There were reports of health worker commitment in
the face of significant danger. One immunization officer
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talked of when a team had been intercepted by Boko
Haram:
Insurgents came and warned them to stop the work
because it is evil. If not, they will kill them next time
they see them doing it. The women thanked them but
continued with their work after the[y]… had left. One
method they adopted is hiding vaccine carriers in
polythene bags… putting the vaccine in between
luggage so as to hide it from anyone watching them.
Discussion
As noted earlier, the Yobe State HMIS did not provide data
of sufficient completeness and reliability to allow construc-
tion of a simulation model based upon the linkages sug-
gested by Fig. 1 and thus exploration of sensitivity analysis
with respect to key variables. However, review of vari-
ables and linkages in the context of the recorded GMB
discussion, further review of interview transcripts, and
triangulation using HMIS data together supported the
identification of major explanatory pathways amongst
the multiple linkages indicated by the initial causal loop
analysis. These pathways may be understood as feedback
loops extending across multiple domains that have influ-
ence on variables of particular concern for our analysis:
utilization of health services and health care quality. Rather
than focusing on specific balancing or reinforcing loops,
points of influence and leverage were — through stake-
holder consultation – found to be most effectively identi-
fied by specifying key pathways of threat and response.
Fig. 4 shows the explanatory structure that evolved, with
key pathways of threat and disruption (marked in black)
and of response and adaptation (marked in grey) indicated.
The threat pathway to the left of the figure shows the im-
pact of insecurity on service utilization and health care
quality through depletion of the human resources available
to the health system. Mediated by fear and anxiety, this
pathway reflects both the direct loss of personnel to the
health system and the loss of capacity due to the with-
drawal of technical assistance to support health workers.
The threat pathway in the central section of the figure indi-
cates the influence of insecurity on health service utilization
and health care quality through restricting access to health
services, either directly through transport difficulties or in-
directly as a result of population displacement.
The systems analysis facilitated by GMB thus indicated
two major pathways of threat, both emanating from the
central driver of insecurity: one fundamentally eroding
human resource capacity available to the health system
and one fundamentally disrupting patient access to ser-
vices. Systems analysis also provided insight into the
major pathways of response and adaptation to these
threats, and the principal drivers of these pathways.
Three principal drivers, each responsible for a discrete
pathway of systems response (marked in grey in Fig. 4),
were identified. GMB participants judged what they
termed political will [30, 31] on the part of State Gov-
ernment and other parties to have reinforced a number of
pathways ameliorating systems impacts of insecurity. These
included direct attempts to normalize conditions through
liaison with the JTF, such as efforts to minimize transport
disruption and reduce fears and anxieties. Most specifically,
there were State actions directly targeting the bolstering of
human resources capability, including the lifting of the re-
cruitment moratorium and ensuring prompt remuneration
for health workers. There were also pre-existing commit-
ments to free-drug supply that was widely seen as pre-
emptive of greater threats to health service provision
through the insurgency (a true basis of systems resilience).
Community resources and cohesion were identified as
another key driver of pathways of influence mitigating the
impacts of the crisis. The community was drawn together
over time to liaise with the security services, which reduced
fear and anxiety and their negative impacts. Communities
pooled resources (knowledge, transport and finance) to
enable physical and financial access to health facilities for
those in need. Communities were also seen to have played
a key role in mobilizing political will, though concerted
advocacy in relation to the fragility of health provision in
the wake of the insurgency.
The other key pathways promoting systems resilience in
the context of the ongoing crisis were seen to stem from
staff commitment and motivation. Although this is difficult
to objectively quantify, interviews and discussion repeatedly
noted the strong commitment of indigenous health workers
and its protective influence. This operated through an ac-
ceptance of a challenging shift pattern that accommodated
to the prevailing curfew and taking on additional responsi-
bilities through informal task-shifting, as well as more dir-
ect influence on quality of care.
Two other areas of Fig. 4 warrant discussion. The flow
of information from and to security services was a core
dynamic underpinning health systems response to the
insurgency. This flow was considered to be very restricted
on initial deployment of the JTF, when a lack of community
awareness amongst a security force largely drawn from out-
of-state created significant tensions. However, as awareness
increased, so did trust and information flow, which was
crucial to the passage of health personnel, patients and
commodities. Coordination between the State Ministry of
Health and security forces enabled health workers to be
cleared faster at check-points after identifying themselves
with special IDs. The JTF also provided security escorts
to patients in emergencies, before insurgents hijacked
the arrangement. In addition to such formal mechanisms,
community health workers reported concerted coordin-
ation with community members who warned health
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workers when it was not safe for them to visit specific
communities, for example, for immunization activities.
Finally, the supply of drugs and consumables and finan-
cial barriers and their linkage to travel and utilization are
not emphasized as major pathways in Fig. 4 as interviews
and GMB discussion confirmed that these had not been
significant variables during the course of the insurgency.
However, as noted earlier in this discussion, this may be
seen as evidence of true resilience in the context of the
Yobe health system: the prevailing decentralized ’push’ drug
supply approach, supported by good state storage capacity
in Damaturu, and the free drug supply policies introduced
before the crisis both served to protect key functional cap-
acities of the system.
The presentation and discussion of these findings
with local stakeholders in Damaturu in December
2014 prompted impassioned debate. Since the time of
interviews and group model building earlier in the
year, insurgent activities had escalated in many parts
of the state. This had led to the forced closure of a
general hospital and two comprehensive health cen-
ters in LGAs exposed to recurrent Boko Haram raids.
While there had been no reported destruction of fa-
cilities and health worker casualties in these areas,
newly-furnished doctors’ quarters in Damaturu had
been attacked and two doctors killed at close range.
This had severely disrupted health service delivery in
the state capital for over one month.
Fig. 4 Systems model developed by stakeholders in Yobe and refined to show key pathways of threat and response (key pathways of
threat in black; pathways of adaptation in grey)
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Discussions confirmed the relevance of the drivers of
political will, community engagement and staff commit-
ment as a basis for recovery from such assaults on the
health system. The state government had recognized the
importance of secure accommodation and was currently
building quarters for health workers within the grounds
of the hospital. The establishment of a life insurance
scheme was seen to have encouraged and motivated
health workers to remain in their posts, and had even
attracted new graduates to seek appointments in the
state. Longer term, noting the high commitment and
retention associated with indigenous staff, greater ac-
cess to health professional careers through enhanced
training institution capacity was considered crucial.
Conclusions
Although quantitative data was not available to pursue
simulation and sensitivity analyses, systems dynamics ana-
lysis using participatory group model building provided a
mechanism to identify key pathways of threat and response
regarding health service functioning. Although these path-
ways are to some degree unique to the specific circum-
stances of Yobe state within the context of the ongoing
insurgency, certain broader systems principles supportive of
resilience are suggested. Reflecting analyses from parallel
studies in Cote d’Ivoire [32] and Eastern Cape province
[33], these include the value of collateral pathways, storage
capacity, narrowing focus, and alignment of motivational
interests. Collateral pathways refer to the availability of al-
ternative routes to achieve a desired goal. In the context of
Yobe this was exemplified by, for example, the accommo-
dation of shift patterns to curfew requirements and the in-
formal task-shifting that enabled key roles to be covered by
available staff. Storage capacity within the system was ex-
emplified by such processes as the increased drug stocks
supplied during periods of security and the number of
Yobe-born health workers available to take up posts in the
state when non-indigenous staff left their positions. Nar-
rowing focus was exemplified by the emerging emphasis on
certain critical services and the occasions when health
workers were withdrawn from some settings and rede-
ployed elsewhere on the basis of prevailing levels of inse-
curity. Finally, aligned motivational interests were reflected
in the number of reports of reduced conflict within health
teams faced by a common threat and the accounts of
increased community cohesion and support through the
course of the insurgency.
These empirically-derived principles bear some coher-
ence with the characteristics of resilient health systems pro-
posed by Kruk and colleagues in their recent conceptual
review in response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa
[8]. They propose awareness, diversity, self-regulation, inte-
gration and adaptation as key elements supporting health
systems resilience.
Diversity, for example, references the value of multiple
mechanisms to address health needs, closely correspond-
ing to the above notion of collateral pathways. Self-
regulation refers to the capability to direct the focus of
services and mobilize resources, akin to notions of nar-
rowing focus and storage capacity suggested here. Inte-
gration — bringing together diverse actors — has close
parallels with the idea of aligned motivational interests.
Perhaps most crucially, this analysis illustrates mecha-
nisms of systems adaptation: ‘the ability to transform in
ways that improve function in the face of highly adverse
conditions’ [8]. Future work should seek to determine
whether the systems features identified here are indeed a
recurrent and useful framing of characteristics support-
ive of resilient health provision. Participatory group
model building offers a potential insightful means of
such explorations.
Endnotes
1Health Systems Resilience: A Systems Analysis is
an associate programme of the ReBUILD Consortium
(www.rebuildconsortium.com).
2See http://nigeriazipcodes.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/07/Yobe-state-Postcode-Map.jpg
3Vensim is a software package used for developing,
analysing, and packaging dynamic feedback models. See
vensim.com.
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